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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
SECURITY COMMITTEE  
COMPARTMENTATION SUBCOMMITTEE

10 May 1983

MINUTES

THIRTY NINTH MEETING

Tuesday, 26 April 1983, 1000 Hours  
Room 4B-867, Pentagon, Washington, DC

[REDACTED]

USAF

25X1

Chairman  
Presiding

(C) MEMBERS/ALTERNATES PRESENT

[REDACTED]

, CIA  
NSA

25X1

Mr Donald W. Stigers, Department of State

[REDACTED]

, USA, DIA

25X1

Maj William H. Poage, USA, Army

Ms Rebecca A. Long, Navy

Mr Louis C. Ritchie, Jr, Department of Energy

Mr Marshall G. Westover, Department of Energy

Ms Mary Andriacchi, Department of Justice

Maj Robert S. Andrews, OSAF

[REDACTED]

USAF/Executive Secretary

25X1

ALSO PRESENT:

[REDACTED]

DCI SECOM Staff

25X1

[REDACTED]

DIA

25X1

DISCUSSION:

1. (U) Approval of Minutes. Minutes of the 10 Jan 1983 meeting of the Compartmentation Subcommittee were approved as written.

2. (U) Revision of DCID 1/7. The Chairman advised that the SECOM had tasked the Subcommittee to review and recommend any needed changes to the draft revised DCID 1/7 in the light of a DIA recommendation to afford the MITRE Corporation access to intelligence marked NOCONTRACT and PROPIN without approval of the originator on a case-by-case basis.

a. (U) The Chairman noted that any change to the DCID on this matter would best be to the Appendix as Note 1 currently

[REDACTED]

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provides that government-owned, contractor-operated (GOCO) laboratories performing classified services in support of the intelligence mission of an Intelligence Community organization, and which are designated authorized channels by the SOIC concerned, are not considered contractors for the purposes of this policy statement.

b. [ ] Subsequent to a lengthy discussion on the matter, the Subcommittee unanimously voted to recommend no change to this aspect of DCID 1/7 thus requiring that cases, such as the DIA nomination of the MITRE Corporation, be considered by the Security Committee on a case-by-case basis. Rationale on this decision was that non-GOCO requests represent a significant departure from the norm and thus require an individual SECOM determination based on the merits of the case. 25X1

c. [ ] Mr Ritchie proposed a change to paragraph 6c, DCID 1/7, concerning use of the NOCONTRACT control marking. 25X1

(1) [ ] His proposed change basically would prohibit use of the NOCONTRACT marking except when usage would prevent a competitive advantage. 25X1

(2) [ ] The Subcommittee unanimously rejected this proposal on the basis that adoption would thus eliminate the extant provision allowing use of the marking on information provided by a source with the express or implied condition that it not be made available to contractors. Mr Ritchie noted that the Department of Energy may reclama this issue at the next SECOM meeting. 25X1

d. [ ] noted a problem with usage of the PROPIN control marking and suggested that the Subcommittee consider revision of either paragraph 6d or paragraph 3 of the Appendix. 25X1

[ ] noted that the latter specifically prohibits release of intelligence marked as PROPIN to contractors unless special permission is obtained from the originator. However, the former is vague on this point. Except for the Department of Justice member who abstained, the Subcommittee unanimously agreed to make no change to paragraph 3 of the Appendix but change paragraph 6d to read as follows: 25X1

"d. "CAUTION--PROPRIETARY INFORMATION INVOLVED" (PROPIN)

This marking may be used, with or without a security classification, to identify information provided by a commercial firm or private source under an express or implied understanding that the information will be protected as a trade secret or proprietary data believed to have actual or potential value to other individuals, organizations, or foreign governments which have interests,

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actual or potential, in competition with the source of the information. Information bearing this control marking may not be released to contractors without the permission of the originating agency. This marking may be abbreviated as "PROPIN" or as "PR."

e. [ ] also proposed to change paragraph 4, Appendix, of the extant version of the draft revision of DCID 1/7 concerning the contracting out of security services. The proposed change was noted to be consistent with DDCI Memo, 19 Aug 83, to the Director, OMB, and (except as explained below) is as follows: 25X1

"4. Intelligence Community security policy requires that the government maintain control over sensitive intelligence and release to contractors only that information required to perform tasks beyond the capability of the government. The DCI has determined that there are significant risks to national security in contracting out support services such as operation of telecommunications centers, automated data systems or other facilities when this permits broad contractor access to all-source or other sensitive intelligence information. Accordingly, Intelligence Community departments and agencies are cautioned against contracting out these services pursuant to Office of Management and Budget Circular A-76, or similar guidance, in cases where the government's control of sensitive intelligence would be substantially diminished or where contractor access to such data would be unnecessarily expanded."

(1) [ ] The Chairman directed that members contact their principals on acceptance of the above change and advise the Executive Secretary of their vote by 3 May 1983. 25X1

(2) [ ] The DIA member later advised of the following additional recommended changes (reflected in the above): STAT

Line 6 above: Changed "security" to "support."

Line 11 above: Inserted "these" between "out" and "services."

(3) [ ] All members, less the DOE member, subsequently advised of their acceptance of the above change to include an additional recommendation proposed by the DIA member. The DOE member advised that his principal had some objections that he intended to present to the SECOM itself at the next meeting. 25X1

3. [ ] Standardized Listing of Abbreviations for SCI Codewords/ Caveats and Related Markings. STAT  
Mr Smith made reference to previous discussion on this matter (see minutes, 19 Oct 82) and asked members whether or not they considered it appropriate to pursue compiling such a listing in view of problems associated with data banks and other unique departmental/agency desires on using their own styles of abbreviations. The Chairman directed

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that members contact their principals on this matter and advise the Executive Secretary of their position by 3 May 1983.

a. [ ] Subsequent voting on this matter was as follows: Members representing the Air Force, DOJ, OSAF, DIA, Navy, and DOE voted to compile such a listing. The State Department member interposed no objection to any course determined by the majority. The CIA, NSA, and Army members advised that they felt that the proposal was not worth pursuing.

25X1

b. [ ] The Chairman, noting the vote of two of the major SCI producers (CIA and NSA) determined that it was no longer appropriate to pursue the matter from an Intelligence Community view but that individual agencies/departments could opt to promulgate a listing of standardized abbreviations for activities under their SCI security cognizance.

25X1

4. [ ] Change in DIA Membership. Due to his pending reassignment to Europe, [ ] USA, announced that effective 16 May 1983, [ ] USA, will be the DIA member of the Subcommittee. The Chairman noted Lt Col [ ] many contributions to the Subcommittee and, on behalf of the entire membership, wished him success in his new assignment.

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5. [ ] Change in NSA Membership. The Alternate NSA Member, Mr [ ], announced that due to the reassignment of the NSA Member, [ ], that he will attend future Subcommittee meetings until a new prime NSA member is selected.

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6. [ ] Next Meeting. The next meeting of the Compartmentation Subcommittee will be announced at a later date. An agenda will be provided when a date is established.

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APPROVED:

Executive Secretary

Chairman, DCI SECOM  
Compartmentation Subcommittee

Copies to: Subcommittee Members  
& DCI SECOM Staff

1 Atch  
Comp SC Ltr to SECOM, 10 May 83,  
Waiver of DCID 1/7 Controls for  
Contractors (U)

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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
SECURITY COMMITTEE  
COMPARTMENTATION SUBCOMMITTEE

10 May 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Chairman, DCI Security Committee

STAT

SUBJECT: Waiver of DCID 1/7 Controls for Contractors

REFERENCES: A. Your Memorandum (SECOM-D-067), 18 Mar 83.  
B. Your Memorandum (SECON-D-082), 11 Apr 83.

1. References tasked the Compartmentation Subcommittee with reviewing general policy for waiving DCID 1/7 controls on release of intelligence to contractors and to recommend any needed changes to the draft revised DCID 1/7 in the light of a DIA recommendation to afford the MITRE Corporation access to intelligence marked NOCONTRACT and PROPIN without approval of the originator on a case-by-case basis.

2. The Compartmentation Subcommittee considered this matter at its 26 April 1983 meeting and unanimously voted to recommend no change to this aspect of DCID 1/7 thus requiring that cases, such as the DIA nomination of the MITRE Corporation, be considered by the Security Committee on a case-by-case basis. Rationale on this decision was that non-GOCO requests represent a significant departure from the norm and thus require an individual SECOM determination based on the merits of the case.

3. The Department of Energy member, Mr Ritchie, proposed a change to paragraph 6c, DCID 1/7, concerning use of the NOCONTRACT control marking.

a. His proposed change basically would prohibit use of the NOCONTRACT marking except when usage would prevent a competitive advantage.

b. The Subcommittee unanimously rejected this proposal on the basis that adoption would thus eliminate the extant provision allowing use of the marking on information provided by a source with the express or implied condition that it not be made available to contractors. Mr Ritchie noted that the Department of Energy may reclama this issue at the next SECOM meeting.

4. [ ] noted a problem with usage of the PROPIN control marking and suggested that the Subcommittee consider revision of either paragraph 6d or paragraph 3 of the Appendix.

STAT

a. [ ] noted that the latter specifically prohibits release of intelligence marked as PROPIN to contractors unless special permission is obtained from the originator. However, the former is vague on this point.

STAT

b. Except for the Department of Justice member who abstained, the Subcommittee unanimously agreed to make no change to paragraph 3 of the Appendix but change paragraph 6d to read as shown in attachment 1.

5. [ ] also proposed to change paragraph 4, Appendix, of the extant version of the draft revision of DCID 1/7 concerning the contracting out of security support services. The proposed change was noted to be consistent with DDCI Memo, 19 Aug 83, to the Director, OMB, and (except as explained below) is as shown in attachment 2.

STAT

a. The Chairman directed that members contact their principals on acceptance of the above change and advise the Executive Secretary of their vote by 3 May 1983.

b. The DIA member later recommended two changes to Mr Paschal's draft paragraph. The two changes are explained below and have been included in attachment 2.

Line 6 above: Changed "security" to "support."

Line 11 above: Inserted "these" between "out" and "services."

c. All members, less the DOE member, subsequently advised of their acceptance of the revision to paragraph 4, as amended by the DIA member. The DOE member reported that his principal had some objections which he intended to present to the SECOM at its next meeting.

STAT

[ ]  
GEORGE J. MERCURO, Colonel, USAF  
Chairman, DCI Security Committee  
Compartmentation Subcommittee

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